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“Good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of 
the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile 
evaluations in this department.”1 
Abstract 
By 2013, sufficient evidence had become publicly available to confirm what 
defence analysts had been suspecting for a while now: the military effectiveness of 
the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is deficient. This article 
proposes that this condition is due to strategic failure, brought about by the dynamic 
interaction between the preferred strategic management model of the organisation 
and its acquired strategic culture(s). The study on which this article reports, further 
suggests that a design school strategic management model best explains the method 
towards the SANDF’s current condition of organisational entropy, but that its root 
cause actually lies in a dichotomous strategic culture. In combination, these two 
variables conspired to diminish the defence force’s responsiveness to its operational 
context, resulting in the formation of inappropriate strategy that prevented the 
SANDF from achieving military effectiveness. While the authors consider the article 
to be hypothesis generating, it also has an exploratory dimension and paves the way 
for a validational study at a later stage. Part 1 therefore argues towards a strategic 
management model that could explain the SANDF’s strategy formulation process, 
its method of ensuring that strategic outcomes correlate with strategic intent, and 
ultimately its weakness in accounting for the external environment in realised 
strategy. This first part mainly employs 
inductive reasoning and draws its conclusions 
from an eclectic literary review that included 
business studies and dynamic systems theory.  
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Introduction 
If one is to believe the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, the 
SANDF appears to be on the verge of its second major transformation since its 
establishment in 1994. On 23 May 2013, the minister again delivered her preamble 
to the annual debate on the defence budget vote. This time, though, the tone of the 
minister’s communication differed markedly from that of the previous year.2 
Whereas the 2012 version fixated on domestic departmental matters such as the 
adjustment of salaries, the establishment of crèches at military bases, and the 
institution of a military ombudsman for managing grievance procedures,3 the latest 
speech displayed a marked concern with the military effectiveness of the armed 
forces. This interest seems to have arisen subsequent to the Battle in Bangui, fought 
two months previously in the Central African Republic (CAR) by elements of the 
SANDF. Some of the speculative doubts regarding the performance of the SANDF 
in operations were confirmed in this encounter,4 and “… in the aftermath of these 
events, the department has had to conduct deep introspection and review, the result 
of which will have serious implications for the work and organisation of our armed 
forces, particularly during this financial year”.5 
As ministerial epiphanies go, this one in particular had been a long time in 
revealing: almost two decades, in fact, since the promulgation of the White Paper on 
National Defence 19966 and the Defence Review 1998.7 Serving as the foundation 
of the SANDF’s intended military strategy, these venerable defence policy 
publications initiated defence reform (or ‘transformation’, as South Africans are 
wont to call it) after the country’s peaceful revolution in 1994. Moreover, these very 
same policy publications were still in force – in spite of government professing a 
concern with military effectiveness, and committing itself to a revision of defence 
policy at the same time8 – fifteen years later, when the SANDF evacuated its 
casualties from Bangui in 2013. Mounting evidence from a variety of sources 
(including those from official accounts, such as the draft Defence Review 2012)9 
lately seems to suggest that “[t]he SANDF has both feet on a slippery slope to 
nowhere: it cannot fund operations, training or maintenance properly and it is in no 
position to push ahead with even the most critical equipment projects.”10 Defence 
policy and intended military strategy have produced neither the results the South 
African government apparently desires, nor what the armed forces seemingly need. 
Instead, the SANDF seems to have undergone a steady and inevitable deterioration 
of its military capabilities, and have become disappointingly ineffective as a result. 
Essentially, the SANDF’s realised strategy appears to have resulted in the 
maximisation of entropy: a term that physical scientists usually employ in 
connection with closed thermodynamic systems, but which researchers in the social 
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sciences could use in connection with some organisations as well.11 Through the 
achievement of these strategic outcomes, the SANDF seems to be validating Henry 
Mintzberg’s claim that not all intended strategies are realised, and not all realised 
strategies were intended.12 
A defence force in a condition of virtual paralysis, unable to respond 
effectively to the demands placed upon it, should be cause of trepidation for 
politicians and citizens alike. Still, the study on which this article is based, was less 
concerned with the SANDF’s military ineffectiveness as a de facto strategic 
outcome (which the parliamentary opposition has been reporting since 2009,13 and 
the printed media had picked up as well),14 than with the causes of what appears to 
be a strategic miscarriage. Given the surfeit of evidence that supports the proposition 
of military stasis, the article therefore assumes that the transformation strategy of the 
armed forces since the publication of the Defence Review of 1998 has resulted in 
decreased military effectiveness, and that the current organisational entropy is not 
only unacceptably high, but also still increasing. A confirmatory or descriptive study 
of the SANDF’s condition would consequently serve little purpose at this time, but 
uncertainties remain regarding the causes of strategic failure. Whereas the Deputy 
Minister of Defence had asked, during the 1998 Defence Budget speech, whether the 
SANDF was simply an old wolf in sheep’s clothing, the current study was therefore 
intent upon answering a more recent question: what could, by the year 2013, have 
caused the SANDF to masquerade as an old sheep in lion’s clothing?15 Answers to 
this question should not only result in a better understanding of the origins of the 
phenomenon, but may also inform new, appropriate strategies to rehabilitate the 
armed forces. Taking all of the above into account, a full-blown explanatory study 
would probably offer the best solution to the problem; however, the difficulty is that 
such a study, using theory and empirical evidence to validate a plausible hypothesis, 
would be far too ambitious for a single article (even if rendered in two parts).  
Previous research suggests that one of the primary causes of the SANDF’s 
military ineffectiveness may reside in an inappropriate strategy, brought about by 
the dynamic interaction between the organisation’s strategic management model and 
its strategic culture.16 Since all strategic behaviour is also cultural behaviour, the 
study chose to approach the subject of military strategy from an ideological/cultural 
perspective.17  Furthermore, it deliberately considered generic concepts of strategy 
from both the military and business domains, and touched (however superficially) 
on systems theory as well.  While this method may provoke conservative theorists, it 
was nevertheless indispensable for the attainment of the theoretical validity of the 
article. Flowing from these suppositions, one may now proceed to deal with the 
overarching research problem in two stages: in the first, employing basic theory to 
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develop a hypothesis and, in the second, validating the proposed interpretative 
structure and developing a theory. The study therefore only attended to the research 
question posed in the first stage: which strategic management model could a 
researcher gainfully use to explain the causes of the SANDF’s current condition of 
organisational entropy? The study thus had one foot in the realm of scientific theory, 
and another in the domain of social practice. It argued towards acceptance of an 
elementary strategic management model that could plausibly explain the manner of 
the SANDF’s strategy formulation, its method of aligning strategic outcomes with 
its intended strategy during implementation, and its lack of responsiveness to 
emergent effects from its operational environment.  
Defining the parameters of a management model  
In spite of what those of reductionist/logical empiricist convictions may 
believe, the strategic management model proposed in this article does not purport to 
be an objective representation of the actual system. Its validity does not depend on it 
being true or false when compared with the empirical evidence, but rather on its 
usefulness and appropriateness to resolve the research problem.18 The proposed 
model would have to account for the fact that, although an intended strategy may not 
always have been explicitly formulated (or even necessary) for coherent activities to 
transpire, it would almost invariably have been present before the SANDF took 
action at strategic level.19 One may also approach the defence force’s strategy from 
the other end, though: as a posteriori, realised strategy, and then work back towards 
identifiable patterns in the stream of leadership decisions that had resulted in 
strategy formation over time. In contrast to the SANDF’s intended strategy, its 
realised strategy would only have become visible subsequent to its implementation, 
being a product of evolutionary adaptations that the intended strategy underwent 
during its execution.20 For the researcher, a study of an intended strategy (such as 
could be deduced from the Defence Reviews of 1998 or 2014, for example) would 
reveal much of the strategists’ normative orientations and perceptual mind-sets at the 
time of strategy formulation. An interrogation of realised strategy, on the other 
hand, would expose the organisation’s actual strategic behaviour, as it had 
responded to influences from its changing operational environment during strategy 
formation. To ensure the article’s theoretical validity, therefore, the proposed 
strategic management model would have to account for both approaches.21 
Although rather shy on the mechanics of strategy formulation, Henry 
Mintzberg provides a way of combining the possible outcomes of strategy formation 
in a single diagram. First, he describes those intended strategies that largely become 
realised, calling them ‘deliberate strategies’. Executing a deliberate strategy means 
that an organisation would – while being responsive to emerging environmental 
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influences – actively manage its intended strategy, in conscious pursuance of 
achieving its desired ends. Second, Mintzberg notes that some intended strategies 
remain essentially unrealised, due to unrealistic expectations of the strategy, 
misjudgements of environmental influences, or unresponsiveness to changes in any 
of these settings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Types of strategy22 
Third, Mintzberg mentions the realisation of strategy that is for the most part 
unintended, either because strategists conceived the intended strategy poorly, or 
subordinates did not understand it clearly, or leadership – through inaction – allowed 
an emergent strategy to supersede it.23 While all realised strategies will contain 
elements of emergent strategy (those influences from the external environment that 
cannot be controlled or eliminated, but which can be mitigated or exploited), 
unresponsive organisations are particularly susceptible to the undesirable effects of 
emergence. “Strategy abhors a vacuum: if the strategic function is lacking, strategic 
effect will be generated by the casual accumulation of tactical and operational 
outcomes.”24 Organisations can therefore not choose whether they should strategize 
and display strategic behaviour or not – doing nothing also becomes strategy 
formation, albeit by default rather than by intent. 
In compiling a strategic management model, the current study also had to 
consider the notion that the organisational structure of any system is a major 
determinant of the establishment’s ability to contend with environmental 
complexity. An investigation into the causes of the SANDF’s strategic entropy 
should therefore include an interrogation of the defence force’s structure as well.25 
However, the current study was more interested in the development of a model that 
would explain the organisation’s strategic behaviour, than in describing the 
attributes of the structure of the organisation. This approach becomes all the more 
viable if one bears in mind that “… strategies developed without considering the 
Realised Strategy 
Unrealised Strategy Emergent Strategy 
Deliberate Strategy Intended Strategy 
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possible behavioural aspect of organisational reality are doomed to fail”.26 The study 
therefore simply assumed that the SANDF, like most military institutions, is an 
example of a classical hierarchy or ‘machine bureaucracy’, a structure characterised 
by a centralisation of authority, emphasising the differentiation between a small 
number of thinkers at the top and a large number of implementers in the lower 
echelons. Machine bureaucracies are best suited for the execution of highly 
articulated strategic plans, within relatively stable environments, according to 
standardised procedures, and using detached forms of control. In other words, 
machine bureaucracies connote best with stabiles that manage given strategies, 
rather than with mobiles that effect strategic transformation.27 While it is true that 
machine bureaucracies, too, are sometimes in need of a major reformulation of their 
strategies (as with the SANDF after 1994), there is sufficient evidence that their 
chief executives view themselves as custodians of existing strategies rather than as 
the champions of innovative new ones.28  
Another matter in need of confirmation is that all militaries are concurrently 
engaged in the forming of at least two types of military strategy: an operational 
strategy (based upon existing military capabilities), and a force developmental 
strategy (based upon future threats, tasks and/or objectives).29 Given that the 
SANDF has not been required to form strategies for major combat operations since 
its establishment, the study will henceforth confine itself to (peacetime) force 
development strategy only. This immediately creates another potential challenge in 
that the perception among many analysts is that military effectiveness – that attribute 
with which the SANDF apparently has a problem – is only empirically measurable 
after the armed forces’ deployment in active operations. Fortunately, others are of 
the opinion that the operations research approach to military competency is 
inadvisable, for at least two reasons:  
 First, operations research primarily focuses on the war mode and the 
tactical level of war – the outcomes of battles, or the expression of fighting 
power; and  
 Second, the operations research method is primarily interested in 
quantitative research, using empirical data and measuring effectiveness in 
terms of material assets or historical outcomes.  
The article therefore prefers Brooks and Stanley’s framework30 for military 
effectiveness, which conveniently allows for a study of realised military strategy in 
peacetime (focused primarily on the political and strategic levels) and the adoption 
of a qualitative research methodology.  
Finally, the article is an affirmation of the fact that the body of knowledge 
on strategic management has expanded vastly since the days when strategy was 
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associated exclusively with the military. Any investigation into the evolution of the 
SANDF’s strategy formation since its founding would consequently be obliged to 
venture beyond traditional strategic studies and account for these management 
theories as well. The article will therefore introduce the static and dynamic models 
of strategic management right from the start, albeit only through a brief discussion 
of limited notional depth. As the argument unfolds, the article will concurrently 
report on a critical analysis of the generic military strategy formulation method, 
thereby suggesting the first potential cause of defence’s current lack of military 
effectiveness, being the adoption of a management model that was ill suited to 
resolve the SANDF’s strategic problem during the first decade of its existence 
(1994–2004).  
The military’s penchant for ‘rational’ strategy formulation 
While strategists have never had an easy time in the past, the complexity of 
their function seems to be increasing more rapidly of late. Regulating the interaction 
between the organisation and its operational environment has become the prime 
function of strategic management, one that strategists have traditionally resolved by 
reducing the conundrum into discrete, functional segments, and then analysing each 
in turn. However, in the face of perceptions that such functional approaches 
invariably result in departmental rivalries, sub-optimal performance at organisational 
interfaces, increasing entropy, and eventual stagnation and decline, strategists are 
lately obliged to adopt a holistic, multi-disciplinary and systemic view of strategic 
management.31 They have come to understand that strategic visioning and strategic 
analysis are equally important in strategy formation; moreover, that strategists’ 
assumptions and beliefs, as well as the socio-political dynamics of the institution, 
are decisive in the form and content of the strategy that an organisation produces.32 
This does not mean that modern dynamic systems thinking have replaced the 
traditional view of organisations as pyramids, though. In the main, organisations still 
view themselves as hierarchies that operate in accordance with strategies generated 
at the top, subsequently to be cascaded down to the lowest ranks during the 
implementation of strategy. It seems that the absence of an agreement on a lucid, 
unambiguous and reliable model of the strategic management process is fuelling the 
continuing debate among strategic management schools.33 In the interests of 
simplification, the current study assumed that two broad philosophies are contesting 
the issue: the design (prescriptive, static) school of thought, and the dynamic 
(crafting, emergent) school.34 Whereas the discussion that follows initially deals 
with these two schools as theoretical constructs at opposite ends of a strategic 
management scale, in practice, the difference between strategic managers’ 
approaches would be largely a matter of degree only.  
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At the one end, strategists of the design school live in a pedantic universe, 
where they look back from an envisioned, desired future state and formulate all-
embracing strategies for implementation in the present. To them, strategic 
management is a linear, sequential process in which an organisation formulates, 
implements and then controls a strategy that it deems appropriate to achieve an 
imagined, preferred condition in the future – drawing a straight line between 
intended strategy and realised strategy, in other words.35 Militaries are apparently 
fond of using the design-school strategic management model, believing that – 
 Strategy is proactive and anticipatory;  
 Strategy is directive, hierarchical, comprehensive and holistic; and 
 Any strategy carries the risk of either failing to achieve one’s objectives, 
and/or of providing significant advantage to one’s adversaries.36  
Military strategists traditionally determine the measure of this risk by 
gauging the imbalance between the ends (objectives), means (resources), and ways 
(methods) of strategy; thus, the planner only has to bring these three elements into a 
better balance to enhance the probabilities of strategic success.37 Finally, the military 
strategist also believes that “… strategy is a disciplined thought process that seeks to 
apply a degree of rationality and linearity to an environment that may or may not be 
either, so that effective planning can be accomplished”.38 In spite of their preference 
for a rational and scientific approach to strategy making, military strategists are 
however also mindful that the validity of their environmental analysis is dependent 
upon their perception and understanding of world events, especially in relation to 
their own religious and political beliefs. Since it is at this point that the study began 
to establish a connection between defence’s strategic management model and its 
strategic culture, the following is worth quoting in full:  
Consequently, the strategist’s Weltanschauung is both an objective 
view of the existing current environment and an anticipatory 
appreciation of the implications of continuities and change for the 
nation’s future well-being. Appreciating that the strategic 
environment possesses the characteristics of a system of systems and 
exhibits some of the attributes of chaos theory, the strategist accepts 
that the future is not predictable but believes it can be influenced and 
shaped towards more favorable outcomes. His weltanschauung 
makes the strategist sensitive to what national interests are and the 
threats, challenges, and opportunities in regard to them. However, a 
new, focused strategic appraisal is conducted when circumstances 
demand a new strategy or a review of the existing strategy is 
undertaken. Understanding the stimulus or the requirement for the 
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strategy is the first step in the strategic appraisal. It not only provides 
the strategist’s focus and motivation, but will ultimately lend 
legitimacy, authority and impetus to the appraisal and strategy 
formulation process and the subsequent [sic] implementation of the 
strategy.39 
From the above, the reader can make at least two important deductions: first, 
the strategist’s personal worldview is indeed a crucial factor in strategy formulation, 
in spite of the alleged objectivity of the ‘scientific method’ employed by the 
military. That which the military therefore thinks of as ‘rational’ may not be so 
logical after all. Design school theory also supports this deduction in the sense that it 
considers organisational values (the beliefs and preferences of top managers) and 
social responsibilities (the ethics of the society in which the organisation is 
embedded) to be important in strategy formulation.40 A second deduction is that the 
construction and management of military strategy seem to be a formal, sequential 
and hierarchical process. The military strategist not only thinks of conscious 
deliberation as being superior to action in general, but also as preceding strategic 
implementation in time; consequently, management tends to separate the work of 
strategic thinkers from that of the doers.41 In the linear universe of defence planners, 
therefore, the worldview of the military strategist greatly influences strategy 
formulation, but becomes largely irrelevant during the implementation of that 
strategy. The current article elaborates further on this theme in the following section, 
which deals with the military’s traditional method of strategy evaluation and 
selection.  
Testing military strategy for appropriateness 
For the armed forces, a viable strategy option should firstly contain an 
explication of the objectives or ‘ends’ of the strategy, serving defence policy 
interests. Secondly, it should entail a description of the resources or ‘means’ 
(tangible and intangible) that the strategy proposes to employ; and finally, it would 
include the ‘ways’, describing the methods to be employed during the execution of 
the strategy. After applying an evaluation process to each of the strategy options, 
defence leadership eventually selects and refines an intended strategy, ready to 
undergo detailed planning and scheduling.42 For an intended strategy to reach the 
stage of execution, it would therefore have had to pass three tests: those of 
suitability, feasibility and acceptability.43 At first glance, the application of these 
strategic assessment criteria appears deceptively simple and straightforward – until 
one understands that both the goals of strategy and the context of their formulation 
are political rather than functional. Take the norm of suitability, for example. It 
attaches to the strategic ends, and is a measurement of whether the particular 
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strategic option will have the desired effect, solve the strategic problem, and achieve 
its policy objectives. A judgement of ‘unsuitable’ should immediately invalidate the 
particular strategic alternative, thus saving the strategist the trouble of applying any 
of the other tests.44 Next, the feasibility test is an assessment of whether the 
available resources are adequate to execute the proposed course of action, or will be 
so in future. The feasibility test is largely a quantitative assessment of material 
resources and military capabilities (often thought of as ‘restraints’ rather than as 
‘constraints’), but subjective judgement regarding the armed forces’ morale, skill, 
fighting spirit, intellectual capacity and popular support also come into play. Even 
though the tests for suitability and feasibility are complex and require mature 
professional judgement, they still appear to be largely rational and reduce well into 
the linear model previously described.45 The same does not apply to the last test – 
the assessment of acceptability – which is usually applied to the ‘ways’ of the 
strategy, in an effort to determine the practicability of the proposed strategic method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Evaluating strategy options 
The question of acceptability goes much deeper and wider than the mere 
contemplation of techniques and processes, though. It is certainly rational, in the 
sense that it requires the strategist to be proficient in military practice, but it is also 
biased. It is not only an expression of the strategist’s personal worldview, but 
accounts for the value preferences of political decision-makers and society as well.46 
For a defence policy or military strategy to pass the acceptability test emphatically, 
it would therefore have to conform to the values and norms of the whole of the 
Clausewitzian trinity, namely those of government, those of the people, and those of 
the military.47 Testing the strategy option for acceptability thus assumes a 
comprehensive judgement of the proposed strategy in its entirety, constrained as it is 
by decision-makers’ philosophical and ideological convictions, i.e. their ethics, 
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sense of morality and knowledge of legality. Since the strategist conducts this test 
through the cognitive filter of a particular worldview, it is simultaneously much 
more holistic and subjective than the tests for suitability and feasibility are. This test 
will not only express a verdict on the ‘ways’ of a strategy option, but they will also 
influence the decision-maker’s judgement of the suitability of ‘ends’ and the 
feasibility of ‘means’.48  
Consequently, individuals who are steeped in a specific strategic culture may 
consider a particular strategy option as being suitable and/or feasible, while those 
with different philosophical convictions may find the same strategy to be 
‘unacceptable’ in the ends that it seeks, or the means that it intends employing. What 
is more, the issue of acceptability is bound to exert a more subtle, pervasive 
influence over strategy as time passes. For example, a strategy that is both suitable 
and feasible may be successful in the short term, but if that same strategy is in 
conflict with the values and norms of its parent society, it will ultimately fail.49 
Strategy evaluation in the design mode is therefore a proactive process, conducted 
by individuals or teams who are not only cognisant of their physical environment 
(external and organisational), but at the same time also subconsciously constrained 
by the preferences of their particular worldview. While the reasons for a potential 
failure of the strategy to qualify may be apparent to those involved, it is in the 
passing of the tests that the evaluation of the subjectivity, contestability and ultimate 
inconclusiveness of the strategy becomes apparent. Such an evaluation will therefore 
not assist in predicting whether a particular strategy is fit for purpose or whether it 
will be successful; it would merely serve as judgement of the acceptability of the 
proposed strategy in the eyes of those that conducted the assessment.50 A strategy 
encumbered with abstract, ambiguous ends could, for example, still lose its focus 
during implementation, and an intended strategy with inadequate means could also 
become a strategy by default – in effect, a mere function of material factors, which 
achieves only those objectives that management arbitrarily decides to fund.51 None 
of the above bodes well for militaries that are blind to the presence of biased 
worldviews in strategists’ supposedly rational strategy formulation processes. 
Nevertheless, a defence force that anticipates the inevitability of change, which 
recognises the fundamental elements of change when it occurs, and which responds 
appropriately to changes in the external environment may yet avoid the pitfalls of 
subjective thinking. Adopting these conceptual remedies, however, requires an 
infusion of dynamic systems thinking into the design school method that the article 
has reported on thus far.  
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Feedback loops as enablers of responsiveness 
The existence of closed information loops, feeding back into the decision-
making bodies of an organisation, is a fundamental attribute of all complex systems. 
In their most basic form, feedback loops are akin to John Boyd’s now-famous 
OODA loop, which refers to a decision cycle of observe, orient, decide and act. 
(Boyd’s model suggests that strategists base their decisions on observations of the 
working environment, oriented through the filters of the particular planner’s culture, 
cognitive ability and previous experience. Since each strategist of an organisation 
will have his or her personal set of beliefs, the complexity of decision-making will 
increase exponentially as the number of culturally diverse participants in the strategy 
formulation process grows.)52 Feedback loops also establish dependencies between 
management process inputs and outputs, creating the potential for non-linear, 
multifaceted modes of organisational behaviour.53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Formulating intended strategy 
By feeding information regarding the process outputs – for example, refined 
strategy options or the outcomes of deliberate strategy – back to decision-makers, 
these loops enable the organisation to respond appropriately to changes in its 
operating environment. While it is common for stochastic feedback loops to occur 
naturally, institutions often create these mechanisms intentionally to capitalise on 
the promise that they hold. Properly utilised, feedback loops reduce the differential 
between that which the organisation desires (intended strategy) and the outcomes 
that it actually achieves (realised strategy). As was discussed earlier in this article, 
the evaluation of strategy options thus becomes an example of a closed feedback 
loop within the strategy formulation process (Figure 3). While such a feedback loop 
will not assist an organisation in becoming more responsive to its environment 
directly, it could nevertheless encourage an institution to learn about itself, to clarify 
its organisational values and norms, and to shape a coherent strategic culture. For 
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the SANDF, the introduction of such a consensus-forming mechanism would have 
been very helpful prior to the drafting of the Defence Reviews of 1998 and 2014.  
Introducing a closed loop into the linear strategy formulation process again 
suggests that the philosophies of the two strategic management schools under 
discussion are not mutually exclusive, but merely reside at opposite ends of a 
continuum. Every social system (such as the SANDF) seems to employ information 
feedback loops to facilitate the discourse with its environment. It is only in their 
consideration of the scope, frequency and import of these loops that the two 
philosophies differ. One could consequently augment the linear framework further 
by introducing more elements of dynamic systems theory into the process. For 
example, an effective organisation will usually employ another internal, closed-loop 
feedback mechanism to ensure convergence between the intent of the strategy and 
its actual outcomes. In this case, the feedback loop would be comprised of 
performance monitoring, comparing the results of strategy implementation with the 
strategy’s intended objectives, and resulting in an adjustment to a deliberate strategy 
that should narrow the gap between the two. As illustrated below (Figure 4), this 
loop is part of the strategy formation process. It facilitates responsiveness to changes 
in the internal environment and encourages organisational learning.54  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Forming deliberate strategy 
The insertion of a second feedback loop into the diagram now moderates the 
initial conclusion, which was that the worldview of the military strategist in the 
design school model would have a definitive influence on strategy formulation, but 
only a minor effect on the subsequent implementation of the strategy. It now appears 
that the more extended the implementation of strategy (as would be the case with the 
SANDF’s force development strategy, for example), the greater the opportunity for 
the strategist’s culture to, through utilisation of the second feedback loop, influence 
strategic outcomes. Described in terms of Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model 
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(VSM) – an example of the ‘hard’ systems approach – the second loop would be 
part of the integration mechanism of the organisation: a monitoring/control device, 
premised upon the enhancement of institutional efficiency and synergy. The second 
loop links strategic intent with implementation of the strategy, organisational 
objectives with individual interests, and institutional policy with institutional 
product.55 With the basic elements of a potential strategic management model for the 
military thus described, the discussion now turns towards the first hints of an 
explanation for the SANDF’s lack of strategic responsiveness.  
Intimations of risk to the SANDF 
Henry Mintzberg is of the opinion that the schematic, as developed thus far, 
contains two possible sources of strategic risk. The first is that the design school’s 
need for an articulate strategy promotes inflexibility, which is anathema to both 
organisational learning and responsiveness alike.56 There are sound reasons for 
declaring an explicit strategy, though. Like policy, one can interrogate and debate an 
explicit strategy. It can also aid organisational coherence, serve as a rallying point 
for the generation of internal support, and reassure external stakeholders that the 
organisation is attending to their needs – all of which the second feedback loop 
facilitates. However, the flipside of the same argument is that an overt strategy, 
designed to focus strategic activities, may also limit the organisation’s peripheral 
vision, its learning ability and ultimately its responsiveness to changes in its 
operating environment. The more clearly the organisation articulates its strategy, and 
the longer it maintains the paradigm of intended strategy, the more difficult it may 
become to change it when there is clearly a need to do so.57 (This argument would 
be more applicable to organisations steeped in the design school than to those of a 
dynamic bent. To the latter, a clear strategy simply implies a more straightforward 
process of finding and changing those elements of the strategy that, as time marches 
on, appear to be out of step with environmental realities.) The second risk is that an 
enunciated strategy (again, like policy) may, if not actively managed, provoke a 
false sense of understanding among the stakeholders that have an interest in its 
execution. As was suggested in the section on strategy evaluation, a host of political 
and functional considerations accompany the selection and implementation of a 
strategy. Since it is not possible to explain all of these supporting concepts in a 
single strategy declaration, that which decision-makers take the strategy for may 
actually be a caricature of what it truly is. The risk of misunderstandings increases 
further when outsiders, with little knowledge of the organisation’s core business, are 
involved. 58 Under such conditions, one may readily find the incomprehension and 
strategic naiveté of the inept abetting the dogmatism and intransigence of the 
supposedly knowledgeable.  
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The two feedback loops previously described occur entirely within an 
organisation, and are therefore characteristic of a closed system (such as a military 
in peacetime). Introducing a third feedback loop at this time not only opens up the 
organisational system, but also points to the design school model’s most debilitating 
flaw. This loop recognises the organisation’s impact on its surroundings and 
accounts for emergent influences from its functional environment at the same time. 
The mechanism enables the responsive strategist to modify the intended strategy of 
the organisation by adjusting those target settings that the second feedback loop 
initially sought to achieve.59 Since the strategist in this mode has to adapt 
continually to changing sets of assumptions, it is hard to plan for this process. 
However, if effectively utilised this feedback loop should bring about reasoned, 
purposeful adjustments to the original intended strategy. This activity goes to the 
heart of an organisation’s responsiveness and addresses the very essence of the 
debate between the two strategic management schools.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Forming realised strategy 
Compared to the second feedback loop (which dealt with the discrepancy 
between the actual outcomes of the strategy and its declared objectives), the third 
loop presupposes a continuous comparison between realised strategy and the 
realities of the external environment instead. By weighing up the developed 
capabilities of the organisation (or the lack of it) against the current demands of the 
operational environment, this mechanism relentlessly questions the validity of both 
the intended and deliberate strategies. Expressed in terms of the VSM, the third loop 
is part of the adaptation mechanism of the organisation: a sensing/intelligence 
device, premised upon the enhancement of effectiveness and creativity. It is also 
future-oriented, linking the changing external environment with the primary activity 
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of the organisation (its core business or raison d’être) through the production of 
revised policy.60 In contrast with the second feedback loop, which aids 
organisational efficiency in ‘doing things right’, this one biases the institution 
towards operational effectiveness in finding ‘the right things to do’. By adding the 
third loop, the schematic now resembles the type of double-loop organisational 
learning that Argyris and Schön (1978) describe, and approaches a strategic 
management model with which the dynamic school would be more comfortable.61 
However, it is precisely in this realm of strategy formation that the constructs of the 
design school begin to take serious strain. Strategists from the design school are 
inherently averse to the intuitive, holistic, mutable approach that the external 
adaptation loop implies. They tend to slight the influence of emergence, and are 
therefore less responsive to strategic context; furthermore, they are inclined to 
separate the formulation of strategy from its implementation (and strategic thinkers 
from strategy’s doers), both in hierarchical primacy and antecedent in time.62 
This does not imply that the dynamic school model would be strategists’ 
first choice under all circumstances, though – there are times of stability when the 
design school approach might actually work better.  However, under most operating 
conditions, the majority of organisations have to contend with a flood of influences 
from their external environment, to the extent that all of their realised strategies 
contain elements from both emergent and deliberate strategy formation.63 The 
effects of emergence would be even greater during or immediately after major shifts 
in context, such as that which the SANDF would have been operating under during 
the first decade of its founding. Under such conditions of uncertainty, responsive 
organisations will attempt to become more effective by deliberately connecting 
thought and action so intimately that the information feedback loops condense into a 
continuous spiral of strategy formulation–implementation–formulation cycles (the 
familiar OODA loops again).64 A responsive organisation would then be intent upon 
simply coping as best it could, learning as rapidly as possible, and continuously 
probing its way towards a new strategic paradigm – organisational behaviour that 
strategists from the design school often connote negatively with adverse effects such 
as ‘strategic erosion’, ‘improvisation’, ‘opportunism’ or ‘strategic drift’.65 Moreover, 
the belief that strategy formulation is a controlled, conscious thought process, 
conducted over time, and giving birth to fully explicated strategies that the 
organisation implements thereafter, exacerbates the consequences of the design 
school strategist’s cognitive bias.66 Modern militaries have become aware that 
strategic thinkers and planners are incapable of calculating everything in advance, 
and that intended strategies will always be incomplete and sometimes even blatantly 
wrong. On the other hand, more conservative defence forces may find that, during 
the unavoidable delay between the implementation of intended strategy and the 
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realisation of strategic outcomes, they have analysed and planned themselves into 
obsolescence. This risk of increasing entropy would be all the more plausible for a 
military that does not receive regular feedback from active participation in combat 
operations, such as an SANDF in peacetime. 
Feedback loops as facilitators of ambiguity 
The lags that are characteristic of feedback loops create problems for a 
strategist who seeks predictability and control of the outcomes of the strategy. Some 
management activities are subject to inertia or delay (occasionally measured in 
years), which temporarily conceals the ultimate consequences of strategic behaviour. 
Inertia implies that elements within the organisation tend to maintain their initial 
state over time, and only change eventually in accordance with the net imbalance 
between the different forces acting upon those constituents. To an organisation bent 
on deliberate transformation, inertia may be judged ‘better’ or ‘worse’, depending on 
the nature of its contribution towards the achievement of the strategic objectives of 
the institution. An example of the former would be an SANDF maintaining its 
administrative competency due to the retention of well-trained staff from a previous 
dispensation, while an illustration of the latter would refer to an SANDF that has to 
cope with legacies of racism and sexism from the same era. The concept of delay, on 
the other hand, refers to a change of output that relates directly to the adjustment of 
input, but separated by a finite interval of time. For a strategist of the design mould, 
delay is generally not ‘good’; it contributes to uncertainty, risk and complex 
dynamic behaviour, and it is demanding of organisational flexibility to resolve the 
potential loss of control. The probability of unintended consequences becomes even 
more significant for an organisation in the throes of transformation (such as the 
SANDF of a decade ago) when one considers that any process involving 
organisational learning and culture change is equally subject to the intrinsic delays 
of feedback loops.67 To cap it all, some of the delayed outputs of the feedback loops 
actually reinforce the original inputs of the strategy. The promotion of personnel for 
reasons other than professional competency, for example, could generate multiplier 
effects that not only amplify organisational disorder, but may also produce 
exponential growth in similar appointments.68 
There are more hazards for an organisation such as the SANDF, which had 
been transforming from one state of stable equilibrium to another. Under these 
conditions, managers are often under the impression that the system invariably 
migrates to new behavioural patterns that are orderly, regular and consensual, partly 
because of their own actions, and partly because of the natural tendency of the 
system towards social convergence. Management then believes that the interim 
states of the organisation are transient, of lesser consequence, and undemanding of 
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major intervention. In practice, though, the deliberate transition from an existing 
condition of stability to the desired end-state of a transformation strategy may prove 
to be unnavigable, with the result that systemic failure transpires before the 
organisation attains the desired equilibrium.69 It is therefore a combination of 
feedback loops, with their implied inertia and delays, which allows one to connect 
the management paradigm of the SANDF with its strategic behaviour. This concept 
also permits the generation of useful theories that explain those aspects of the 
organisation’s strategy formation that may otherwise be incomprehensible. (For 
example, Figure 5 shows three feedbacks loops that conjoin at the strategy 
formulation centre of an organisation, where personnel representing the intelligence 
and operational control functions should be in constant communication and 
interaction with each other. Here, too, senior management should be monitoring the 
on-going strategic debates, with the express purpose of learning about those key 
issues that should drive the strategy of their organisation.70 Could an absence of 
these frank discussions in the SANDF not have contributed to the formation of 
inappropriate strategy?) One can now expand the line of argumentation by asking 
where the major concerns for an internal debate might have arisen from, and how 
armed forces generally determine the importance and urgency of those issues for the 
making of force development strategy. 
Unpacking the context of strategy formation  
In the normal order of things, defence policy follows on a national security 
strategy, which one can describe as “the process of maintaining, coordinating and 
employing the assets of the security sector so that they contribute optimally to the 
nation’s strategic goals”.71 A defence policy should therefore only be one of many 
governmental policies, all premised on the imperatives of an explicit national 
security strategy. This is not the case in South Africa, though, since government has 
failed to publish such a document since democratisation in 1994 – a fact implicitly 
recognised by the draft Defence Review 2012, when it speaks of the “emergent 
national security strategy”.72 Nevertheless, such an omission is by no means fatal to 
policy making, if one agrees with Huntington’s view that defence policy is neither 
the outcome of a clear pronouncement of national objectives nor entirely the result 
of military logic.73 In contrast to the planning of other state departments (agriculture, 
economic affairs or education, for example), defence preparations are subject to a 
much greater degree of uncertainty and unquantifiable risk, which implies that the 
making of defence policy is never a wholly rational process in any case.74 One can 
therefore consider defence policy as a political statement of the inevitable interplay 
between foreign policy (where the allocation of values affects relations between 
national states) and domestic policy (where the actions of government affect the 
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allocation of values among groups within society).75 In Figures 3 to 5, the study has 
grouped these two dimensions together under the external environment.  
Dandeker, in an article on civil–military relations, adopts a similar tack. He 
describes the first-mentioned domain as the international context of civil–military 
relations, from which those risks, threats and opportunities arise that prompt 
governments to create military organisations in the first place.76 This setting 
connotes with the ‘functional imperative’ of strategy, where states are concerned 
with the demands of international politics, the goals of foreign policy, and the 
development of military strategy. Cognition of the functional imperative should 
result in policy expressions of instrumental or utilitarian decisions that concern the 
deployment, commitment and employment of armed forces. The second domain, on 
the other hand, refers to a country’s domestic context, comprising of social, 
economic, technological, political, and – significantly for the purposes of this article 
– cultural factors. As we have seen during the discussion on the evaluation of 
strategy options, defence policy and military strategy are obliged to accommodate 
the cultural values of the host society, even if these appear to be in conflict with 
tenets of the accepted military ethos (such as formal discipline, subordination of the 
individual to the group, and unquestioning obedience to superiors).77 Concern with 
the ‘societal imperative’ in defence also gives rise to structural (as opposed to 
military-strategic) policy decisions:  
 The size and distribution of the armed forces’ budget;  
 The composition, numbers and service conditions of defence personnel;  
 The procurement and distribution of equipment and commodities to the 
defence force; and  
 The models and processes by which the military is organised and 
administered.78  
Defence policy – and force development strategy – consequently has to 
reconcile concurrent demands from both the foreign and domestic policy 
environments, in ways that balance international security risks with the internal 
security demands of stakeholder groups within society.79 While Dandeker therefore 
advocates the necessity for policy makers to maintain an appropriate balance 
between the functional and societal imperatives, he continues to add a third, internal 
dimension to the context of strategy formation. He calls this “the weight of history”, 
which is comprised of (among others) the particular society’s experience of war, the 
social status and positional power of their military, and society’s history with 
conscription – all of which are associated with a defence force’s sources of strategic 
culture, as discussed later in the article.80 A connection between this organisational 
imperative and the societal and functional imperatives is also established when 
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Dandeker says, “… in adjusting to changes in society and international security, 
[leaders] have to take into account the history and traditions of the individual armed 
services, which are normally critical factors in sustaining their identity, sense of 
shared purpose and morale”.81 To this, one may add the history, traditions and 
structures of the formations within the services, and conclude that decision-makers 
are obliged to formulate defence policy and military strategy in acknowledgement of 
a triptych of imperatives, and not merely of the pair postulated by Huntington. 
In summary, the study therefore presents the strategic imperatives as firstly 
the functional, being a distillate of the strategic context and focused on rendering 
effective militaries; and secondly, the societal, being a reaction to the perceived 
needs of a citizenry that (in democracies, at any rate) provides resources and on 
whose behalf the military conducts its business. Whereas strategists of the design 
school are inclined to describe the functional and societal imperatives as one concept 
(the external environment), the analysis has now confirmed that it actually consists 
of two discrete domains.82 Through Dandeker’s description of the internal context, it 
was further possible to draw the management activities related to strategy initiation, 
analysis, evaluation, selection and monitoring into a single organisational 
imperative.83 Apart from the aforementioned ‘rational’ strategy-formation 
behaviours, though, the internal context also accounts for the beliefs, values, norms 
and collective mind-sets of the organisation – its organisational culture(s), in other 
words. In the section on the evaluation of strategy options, the study has already 
indicated that the cultural beliefs of strategists could influence their perceptions of 
reality more than impartial analyses do. Moreover, it is possible that an 
organisational culture could reinforce some aspects of its members’ original mental 
maps and eventually turn these maps into paradigms – archetypes that become 
unquestioned truths and subsequently obstruct organisational learning.84 As 
previously intimated during a brief discussion of John Boyd’s OODA loop, these 
paradigms could not only have significant implications for initial strategy 
formulation, but they could also bias strategists’ perception and understanding of the 
external and internal environments during continued strategy formation. 
By themselves, tacit cultural biases are not necessarily at odds with the 
forming of appropriate strategy. When in the company of strong political forces, 
however – as when strategy requires organisational restructuring at senior level, or 
when it threatens to undermine existing power bases – cultural bias may debilitate 
an organisation.85 In such cases (as presumably with the SANDF in the first decade 
after its establishment), strategists would do better by recognising and challenging 
not only their own set of assumptions and beliefs, but also those held collectively by 
the organisation for which they are strategizing. Crucial to this balancing process 
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would be the development of analytical processes that provide objective data for 
scrutiny, accompanied in parallel by a continuous dialogue that does not collude or 
reinforce the institutional paradigm, but instead questions and confronts it.86 An 
organisation in a prescriptive strategy formulation mode, though, would be inclined 
to favour rational analysis over this type of internal debate – in effect, it would 
identify with strategy formation as a process of intellectual conception, rather than 
as the consequence of organisational learning.87  
Conclusion 
By this time, the study has presented sufficient evidence to show that 
adherence to the management model of a design school, as opposed to that of the 
dynamic school, may at least be partially responsible for the strategic failure of a 
defence force. The argument started with the assumption that the military 
effectiveness of the SANDF has been suspect for a while now, due to the dynamic 
interaction between two causal variables: the preferred strategic management model 
of the organisation, and defence’s acquired strategic culture. Regarding the first 
element, militaries generally tend to espouse the design school approach to strategy 
formation, where the top echelons of the organisation generate an intended strategy, 
then delineate and express it overtly, and thereafter oversee its implementation. 
During this process, influences from three contextual domains constrain the 
behaviour of strategists. Two of these are external to the relevant institution (the 
functional and societal imperatives), while the third comprises of checks and 
balances from inside (the organisational imperative). Whereas consideration of the 
functional imperative will shift the focus of a defence force towards military 
effectiveness, emphasis of the societal imperative will encourage a concern with the 
particular military’s structure, service conditions and cost-efficiency. The 
organisational imperative, on the other hand, ensures the expression of institutional 
culture in strategy formulation and moderates the influences of the external 
environment on strategy formation. It serves as a sensory filter for the strategist’s 
observations, guides understanding of the situation, influences the evaluation of 
strategy options, and focuses strategic behaviour. Regardless of the institution’s 
choice of strategic management model, the subconscious beliefs of decision-makers 
will therefore have a crucial influence on strategy formation.  
The organisational imperative is located at the centre of a web of feedback 
loops, of which the current study has concerned itself with only three. First among 
these is an assessment loop within the strategy formulation body that pronounces on 
the appropriateness of intended strategy; secondly, there is an internal control loop 
that (in the design school model) should align the outcomes of a strategy with its 
declared intent. Both of these loops exist within a closed strategic management 
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system and offer no solutions to the problem of increasing organisational entropy. 
This leaves the third, external feedback loop, which should be utilised to enable 
responsiveness to the organisation’s operating environment. In combination, the 
proper employment of these feedback loops enhances organisational learning and 
ensures that the realised strategy conserves the functional effectiveness of the 
organisation. However, because strategists of the design school are prone to 
undervalue the influence of the external environment on strategy formation, they 
have insufficient inclination to manipulate emergent strategy. Their organisations 
may therefore be prone to particular afflictions (such as institutional scotomas, 
ideological fixation, and organisational entropy) at any time, but even more so if 
they apply their management model at an unsuitable stage of the establishment’s 
evolution. Due to the delays and inertia that are inherent to feedback loops, the 
strategic risk increases further in organisations that are unresponsive to their 
environments. While delays may allow a peacetime defence force to postpone the 
consequences of an inappropriate strategy for a while, any undesirable outcomes 
will be that much harder to turn around when they eventually do become manifest – 
especially when one considers that some loops feed upon themselves, create 
multiplier effects, and have the potential to destabilise the organisation as a whole. 
Despite everything suggested thus far, though, the extent to which an organisation 
such as the SANDF will suffer the deleterious consequences of an inappropriate 
management model would still be largely dependent upon its cultural reflexes. Part 2 
of the study will explore this supposition further.  
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